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JUDICIAL REFORM FOR ILLINOISt

T

W. F. Zacharias*

suggested by the title assigned to this paper contains
within itself two basic assumptions; one, that there are courts
and judges in Illinois, a fact so evident as to call for no further
elaboration for the moment, and second, that there is something
wrong with the present system which evokes a need for reform.
The frequency with which plans have been proposed to produce judicial reforms of one kind or another,' the amount of energy which
has been expended in furthering such plans, and the countless thousands of words which have been written and spoken on the second
point will serve as attesting witnesses to the fact that there has
been a breakdown in the service function for which courts were
created and which they are supposed to perform in a modern
community. It is not unfair, therefore, to assume that something
must be wrong with the present-day judicial structure in Illinois
before proceeding to ascertain what that something is and what
can be done about it.
HE TOPIC

t Based upon address delivered before the Calvin Club of the Fourth Presbyterian
Church, Chicago.
* Professor of Law and Acting Dean, Chicago-Kent College of Law.

Most notable in that connection, except for the procedural reforms produced by
the adoption of the Illinois Civil Practice Act of 1933, are the proposals of Professor
Kales in his article entitled "Methods of Selecting and Recalling Juges," 5 Journ.
Am. Jur. Soc. 133 (1928); the suggestions contained in the draft of a proposed
constitution submitted but defeated on a referendum in 1922; and the work done by
a Joint Committee of the Illinois State and Chicago Bar Associations leading to a
proposed new judicial article intended to replace Article VI of Ill. Const. 1870.
As to the latter, see Zacharias, "The Proposed Illinois Judicial Article," 30
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW 303-38 (1952), and Sears, "A New Judicial Article for
Illinois," 40 A. B. A. J. 755-8 and 804-7 (1954).
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THE IDEAL TO BE ACHIEVED.

Before so proceeding, a yardstick is needed by which to measure the performance of courts and judges. Such a measuring
rod could then be used not only to support the thesis that the
present system is deficient in its day by day accomplishments
but would also serve as a testing device by which to check the
validity of current or future proposals for reform. At the base
lies a thought which was once best expressed by Blaise Pascal, a
French philosopher-mathematician of the Seventeenth Century.
He wrote:
It is right that what is just should be obeyed; it is necessary
that what is strongest should be obeyed. Justice without
might is helpless; might without justice is tyrannical ... We
must then combine justice and might, and for this end make
what is just strong, or what is strong just.'
These words disclose the ideal toward which all civilized men must
strive if they are ever to attain the highest of possible goals.
Over the centuries, therefore, well-meaning people have struggled
to develop institutions, generally summed up in the loose term
"government", in the firm belief that it is only through the concentrated power of organized society, at least when operating
within a given geographic area, that "might" can be made just
and "right" can be made strong.
It should be unnecessary to detail the historical pattern of
this development or to record the groping steps taken to achieve
the ideal.3 Men at one time looked to emperors and to absolute
monarchs to provide the tools. In a more modern age, they have
turned to democratically operated governments of the people,
working and acting through constitutional forms, to insure respect
for the ideal. Particularly is this true in the United States, and
in each of its components, for there, to prevent perversion of the
2Pascal, Persde8 (Modern Library, New York. 1941), trans. by W. F. Trotter.
p. 103. Also in Pascal, Thoughts (Harvard Classics, New York, 1910), trans. by
Trotter from text by Brunschvicg, p. 107.
3 Zane, The Story of Law (Ives Washburn, New York, 1927), provides a simple
but graphic account. The English story is told In more erudite fashion in Holds-
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ideal through the possible tyranny of too much power in the hands
of one or a few, the governmental power has been defined in written charters and distributed among the three conventional departments with the injunction that no one department shall usurp the
function and authority of the others. 4 Each branch of the government, whether state or federal, has its own peculiar tasks to
perform and a knowledge thereof provides the second measuring
rod by which to evaluate performance.
To the judicial department of the state government, through
the vague-sounding description of an authority to exercise the
"judicial power", 5 the people have delegated the right to adjudicate controversies, to hear and determine cases, not by whim but
according to law, to the end that the strong may not be permitted
to oppress the weak; the cunning may not be allowed to impose
upon the trustful; and the rich may be prevented from using the
power of their wealth to do injustice to the poor.8 Men have
finally come to say, at least within national and state confines,
that their fellows shall no longer rely on uncontrolled force to
settle their disputes, as was once the case. 7 Instead, the resolution
thereof must be left to trained, independent,8 impartial judges,'
worth, History of English Law (Little, Brown & Co., Boston, 1922), particularly
Vol. 1. Millar, Civil Procedure of the Trial Court In Historical Perspective (National Conference of Judicial Councils, New York, 1952), furnishes an excellent
discussion of the procedural devices through which the courts have worked to
effectuate their part of this task. See also Kinnane, Anglo-American Law (BobbsMerrill Co., Inc.. Indianapolis. 1952), 2d Ed.
4 Ill. Const. 1870. Art. III.
5 Ibid., Art. VI, § 1.
6 Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States and all lower federal court
judges take an oath, in part, to "administer justice without respect to persons, and
[to] do equal right to the poor and to the rich." See 28 U. S. C. § 453. The oath
administered to judges elected to the Illinois judicial department is not so
elaborate: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 37, §§ 11, 72.2, 174, 302. 366 and 451.
See also ibid., Ch. 79, § 8.
7 Trial by battle as well as trial by ordeal was a familiar article to the AngloSaxon and Norman forbears of the English race: Pollack and Maitland, The
History of English Law (Cambridge University Press, England, 1911), Vol. 2, pp.
598-600. The first of these methods continued in existence, at least in theory,
until as late as 1818: Ashford v. Thornton, 1 B. & Ald. 405 at 456-7, 106 Eng.
Rep. 149 at 167-8 (1818).
8 Independence on the part of judges is insured, to some degree, by granting them
fairly long terms of office, up to as much as nine years in the case of judges serving
on the bench of the Illinois Supreme Court according to Ill. Const. 1870, Art. VI,
§ 6, and also by constitutional restraint against any diminution in the compensation
of judges during such term: ibid., Art. VI, § 7.
9 Impartiality Is guaranteed not only by denying to any man the right to serve
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persons presumed to be skilled in law hence learned in the right
way of life. To these men has been given the authority to find
and apply suitable solutions for the conflicts which are apt to be
generated among imperfect human beings while living together
in a social state.
Litigation, the process through which these solutions are attained, is no longer an armed conflict fought on the field of battle
but a sublimated form of contest, one waged in the courtroom,
where reason, logically and impartially applied, should and does,
so far as is humanly possible,"0 control the outcome. In that arena,
the only force which ought to be tolerated is the power of the
state, of the people acting collectively, to compel obedience to the
decisions so attained.1 1 It is a proud but also a civilized community which, understanding this fact, yields submissively to
the admonition of a single man, or to the words of a bench of
three, five, seven, nine or more men, then garbed in judicial robes,
as he or they declare the law of the case. In that respect, the
record of the American public has been, in general, a happy and
an exemplary one.
So that none of these things may be lost to sight, expression
has been given thereto in the fundamental documents often deas judge in his own cause, a principle enunciated in Canon 29 of the Canons of
Judicial Ethics of the American Bar Association, but also by providing the litigant
with the means of procuring a change of venue in case bias or prejudice is believed
to be present: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 146, § 1.
10 Generous resort to a right of appeal or the like is usually given to the end
that the possibility of individual error by a single judge may be eliminated. In the
case of a conviction for murder accompanied with a death sentence, this right may
extend to the point of placing the burden on the county to pay for the cost of
securing this review, which cost may include attorney's fees: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955,
Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 730a and § 769a. In all felony matters, a defendant who is unable
to pay the cost of procuring the necessary record to support his appeal may shift
the cost onto the public treasury: Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U. S. 12, 76 S. Ct. 585, 100
L. Ed. 891 (1956), and fl1. Sup. Court Rule 65-1. Even in civil cases, there is
opportunity for the use of less costly methods of presenting the case to the reviewing tribunal than by the conventional printed form: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2,
Ch. 110, § 101.40 and §,201.8.
11 The method of outlawry, once used as a coercive measure to induce compliance
with the community judgment, has long since disappeared from Anglo-American law,
For an explanation thereof, see Pollock and Maitland, op. cit., Vol. 1, pp. 43, 49 and
476-8. Today, the writ of execution on a law judgment or the threat of contempt
process for violation of an equity degree, with an occasional resort to a body
execution in the few limited instances described in Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1,
Ch. 16, § 1, and Ch. 77, § 5, has generally proved to be sufficient.
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scribed as Bills of Rights. As early as 1818 in Illinois, using
words reminiscent of six centuries earlier when an English king
had been forced to seal a Magna Carta, the drafters of the first
state constitution declared:
Every person ought to find a certain remedy in the laws for
all injuries and wrongs which he may receive in his person,
property or reputation; he ought to obtain, by law, right and
justice freely, and without being obliged to purchase 12it,
completely and without denial, promptly and without delay.
Embodied in these words is another version of the same yardstick
as the one aforementioned. Put differently, the measure is one
as to whether or not the courts can and do see to it that might
is made to do right, that what is just is made strong, to the end
that all shall have justice without being obliged to purchase it
and may expect it promptly and without delay. While courts
were originally established for this purpose, the energy of the
founding fathers and of their successors, however, has tended to
outrun their wisdom. By multiplying institutions in an effort to
insure that justice could be so obtained, they have actually worked
to impede its due administration.

II.

THE PRESENT JUDICL&L STRUCTURE.

A brief glimpse at the existing structure of the state judicial
department will illustrate the fact. Starting with some English
models developed between the Eleventh and the Seventeenth centuries, the drafters of the 1818 constitution provided the state
with a fairly simple system of courts. 3 At the township level,
the smallest geographic unit of the state, stood the justice of the
peace. Originally intended to be a man, not necessarily a lawyer,
charged with the responsibility of imposing punishment on petty
12 The text is taken from the provision in its present form in Ill. Const. 1870,
Art. II, § 19. The language of this provision, with but slight modification, first appeared in fl1. Const. 1818, Art. VIII, § 12. and was carried forward into Ill. Const.
1848, Art. XIII, § 12.
18 Actually, the 1818 Constitution provided for one supreme court and for "such
inferior courts as the general assembly shall, from time to time, ordain and
establish." See Ill. Const. 1818, Art. IV, § 1. The courts of the Illinois Territory
of the type here mentioned were, however, continued in existence. See Dupuy, "The
Earliest Courts of the Illinois Country." I Ill. L. Rev. 1 and 81 (1906).

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

criminal offenders, 14 that worthy was also given a minor jurisdiction over certain small civil suits. 15 At the county level, the
principal geographic unit of government in a "horse and buggy"
age, were to be found the county courts; each presided over by
a county judge who, if a lawyer, often found it necessary or desirable to augment his judicial salary and fill out his time with
While these
the fees and labor to be found in private practice.'
that of the
than
plane
dignified
on
a
more
operated
courts
county
justices of the peace, the work done was still of limited character.
In criminal matters, the power to punish was restricted to fine or
imprisonment otherwise than in the penitentiary.' 7 Civil jurisdiction was limited by a maximum figure' as well as confined to
suits of particular specified types. 9
Above these courts and serving as the principal trial court
of the state was the circuit court, operating over an area made
up of a number of combined counties, 20 with the circuit judge
14 His authority was, at one time, restricted to criminal proceedings: Holdsworth,
op. cit., Vol. 1, pp. 285-98. The Illinois justice of the peace may now punish offenders by imposing a fine not to exceed $500 in amount or may Imprison In the
county jail for up to one year: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 79, § 165. He may,
of course, also serve as a committing magistrate: ibid., Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 662 et seq.
15 The details of this civil jurisdiction have varied both in kind and In amount.
Present particulars may be found in Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 79, § 16.
16 The only limit thereon Is that the judge may not serve as attorney in the
court in which he is commissioned or appointed: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch.
13, § 10. For the rule as to circuit judges, see Schnackenberg v. Towle, 4 InI.
(2d) 561, 123 N. E. (2d) 817 (1955).
17 I1. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 37, § 177.
18 Where the suit Is one of ordinary civil cognizance, the amount claimed or
the value of the property in controversy must not exceed $2,000, as fixed by IlL.
Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 37, § 177. A county court proceeding to confiscate
property as contraband is not so limited: People v. 123 Punch Boards, 11 Ill. App.
(2d) 31, 135 N. E. (2d) 820 (1956).
19 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 37, § 177, contains no precise list of cases
but makes reference to "that class of cases wherein justices of the peace now have
or may hereafter have jurisdiction." The scope of the civil jurisdiction of the
county courts can be established by reference to Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 79,
§ 16. In addition thereto, the county court is entitled to entertain adoption proceedings pursuant to ibid., Vol. 1, Ch. 4, § 1-1; has exclusive jurisdiction in
inheritance tax proceedings by virtue of ibid., Vol. 2, Ch. 120, § 388; and acts in
connection with a wide variety of special statutory proceedings.
20 The 1870 Constitution merely directed that, except as to Cook County and
other counties having a population of 100,000, the state should be divided Into
judicial circuits to be formed of "contiguous counties, in as nearly compact form
and as nearly equal as circumstances will permit, having due regard to business,
territory and population." Ill. Const. 1870, Art. VI, § 13. Except for changes which
may have been made at the current session of the General Assembly now in
progress, there are 17 such circuits exclusive of Cook County: Ill. Rev. Stat.
1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 37, § 72.1.
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travelling through these several counties so as to bring justice
to the litigant rather than to bring the litigant to justice. The
circuit court possessed full civil jurisdiction over all types of
cases without regard to the amount involved 2 and could impose
the most severe penalties provided by law for all types of criminal
offenses. To these tribunals of well-defined English origin, American genius added a single reviewing tribunal, here called a Supreme
Court, with state-wide authority,2 2 to pass on all appeals and the
like, which were then taken to it as a matter of right. This court
could, and still does, also exercise a limited degree of original or
trial jurisdiction in a few highly important instances.'
With increases which came in population 24 and with the growth
of cities, the frequent demand upon the legislature for more and
better judicial service was answered not alone by providing more
judges, whether more skilled or not, but also by providing a multiplication of courts with specialized functions to perform. First
came city courts, established approximately between 1850 and
1875, in twenty-nine of the cities 25 which were, to some degree,
21 Ill. Const. 1870, Art. VI, § 12, states: "The circuit court shall have original
jurisdiction of all causes in law and equity, and such appellate jurisdiction as is or
may be provided by law." The "appellate" jurisdiction referred to has generally
been confined to granting trial de novo in cases carried to the circuit court on
appeal from justices of the peace, from probate courts, and from county courts in
the manner directed by Ill. Rev. Stat. 195, Vol. 1, Ch. 3, §§ 484-7; Ch. 37, § 294;
and Ch. 79, § 116. The circuit courts also exercise a degree of supervision over
state administrative agencies, either under the general Administrative Review Act,
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 264 et seq., or by virtue of particular special
statutes, as is true in workmen's compensation matters: ibid., Vol. 1, Ch. 48,
§ 138.19(f) (1). Jurisdiction in relation to statutory proceedings of the nature
of adoption, eminent domain or the like has not been cataloged.
22 For the convenience of litigants, the Illinois Supreme Court, In the period
from 1848 to 1897, conducted divisions of its sessions in three locations, at Mount
Vernon, Springfield and Ottawa. Since 1897, all regular terms have been held at
Springfield: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 37, §§ 5-6.
23 Ill. Const. 1870, Art. VI, § 2. The original jurisdiction in relation to revenue
matters and mandamus has existed since Ill. Const. 1818, Art. IV, § 2; that relating
to habeas corpus was added by Ill. Const. 1848, Art. V, § 5. See also Stanley and
Severns, "The Original Jurisdiction of the Illinois Supreme Court, 22 CHIOAGO-KENT
LAw REVIEW 169-96 (1944).
24 The population, at time of statehood, was estimated at about 18,000. By 1850,
shortly after the adoption of the second constitution, the population had expanded
to 851,470. It had grown to 2,539,891 In 1870, the date when the current constitution
was ratified, and is now estimated to be in the vicinity of 8,750,000. This ten-fold
increase in the past one hundred years has, quite naturally, increased the amount
of work to be done by the judicial department.
25 City courts are presently operating at Alton, Aurora, Beardstown, Benton,
Blue Island, Calumet City, Canton, Carbondale, Charleston, Chicago Heights,
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remote from the county seat where the regular courts of the state
were to be found in operation. To serve the city inhabitants, these.
courts were, in effect, miniature circuit courts possessed of full
civil and criminal jurisdiction but restricted, at least originally,
to persons living within or causes arising inside city limits." These
were followed, beginning in 1877, with probate courts,27 at least
in the larger counties, 28 which specialized in matters concerned in
the handling of the estates of deceased persons, or minors, and of
incompetents. The 1870 Constitution also recognized the existence
of certain police magistrates who had become established in varying municipalities to handle the police and other work previously
performed therein by the justices of the peace. 29 The last major
development in the fabrication of a court system came in 1905-6
when the legislature and the people of Chicago collaborated to
abolish the justice of the peace system within the limits of the
city and to substitute in lieu thereof a Municipal Court, one of
unique type and possessed of an expanded civil and criminal jurisDeKalb, Du Quoin, East St. Louis, Eldorado, Elgin, Granite City, Harrisburg.
Herrin, Johnston City, Kewanee, Litchfleld, Marion, Mattoon, Moline, Pana, Spring
Valley, Sterling, West Frankfort and Zion. Only the courts at Benton, Charleston,
Harrisburg and Marion are located In county-seat towns.
26 [i1. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 37, § 333. These courts are denied jurisdiction
over adoption proceedings: ibid., Vol. 1, Ch. 4, § 1-1. The holding in Werner v.
Illinois Central R. R. Co., 379 Ill. 559, 42 N. E. (2d) 82 (1942), which placed
sharp limitations on the power of city courts, was later nullified by the determination in the case of Turnbaugh v. Dunlop, 406 Ill. 573, 94 N. B. (2d) 438 (1950),
so these courts may now hear cases based on transitory causes of action arising
outside of municipal limits provided other jurisdictional and venue requirements
are observed.
27 Courts of probate had been established In Illinois as early as 1829, pursuant
to Laws 1829, p. 37, but lasted only for a few years when, by Laws 1837, p. 176,
they were abolished and their jurisdiction was transferred to probate justices of
the peace in each of the counties. The present set of courts owe their existence
to Laws 1877, p. 79, as amended: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 37, § 299 et seq.
28 Fourteen such courts exist and are to be found in Cook, DuPage, Kane, Lake,
LaSalle, McLean, Madison, Peoria, Rock Island, St. Clair, Sangamon, Vermilion,
Will and Winnebago counties. In the other counties of the state, the probate
jurisdiction Is exercised by the county courts pursuant to Ill. Rev. Stat. 1055, Vol.
1, Ch. 37, § 175.
29 See Ill. Const. 1870, Art. VI, § 1. The authority for the existence of police
magistrates prior to that time had depended upon the particular terms of the
several special acts under which various city and town governments had been
established. Courts of this character are now authorized by the general Cities
and Villages Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 24, particularly § 9-73.
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diction. 0 That court statute served as the model for still another
statute authorizing the creation of comparable municipal courts 1
of the type to be found in the neighboring suburbs of Evanston
and Oak Park.2
Where completely new courts were not created, the work
being done by already established tribunals was broken up and
fed out in pieces, under a fragmentary approach, to still other
judicial bodies. Thus, at the trial level and particularly in Cook
County, some of the work of the circuit court was turned over
to a Criminal Court.3 3 Other parts of its jurisdiction, relating to
the treatment and control of dependent, neglected or delinquent
children, were assigned to a Juvenile, now called a Family, Court. 4
30 See, in particular, Ill. Const. 1870, Art. IV, § 34, as amended in 1904, and
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 37, § 356 et seq. The jurisdiction of the Municipal
Court of Chicago. set forth in ibid., Ch. 37, § 357, is comprehended within six
classes of cases. Cases of the First, Second and Fourth Class are of civil cognizance
which arise from designated types of conduct constituting legal wrongs. No equity
jurisdiction has been conferred. The principal difference between First and
Fourth class cases lies in the amount recoverable. Fifth Class cases include all
quasi-criminal actions except bastardy proceedings. The court, in connection
with Sixth Class cases, serves more or less as an examining magistrate would.
The power to adjudicate criminal cases is found in relation to Third Class cases
and extends to punishment by fine or by imprisonment otherwise than in the
penitentiary but is limited by the requirement that the offence must occur within
municipal limits.
31 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 37, § 442 et seq. Care should be exercised
to avoid confusing the general Municipal Court Act, which was enacted in 1929,
with the special statute relating to the Municipal Court of Chicago, referred to in
note 30, ante. There are differences between the two. Thus, a general municipal
court may exercise jurisdiction over tort claims for personal injury without regard
to the amount involved whereas the jurisdiction of the Municipal Court of Chicago
in such matters is subject to a maximum monetary limitation. Compare the holding in Starck v. Chicago & North Western Ry. Co., 4 Il1. (2d) 616, 123 N. E. (2d)
826 (1955), noted in 33 CHIOAGO-KENT LAW REvIEw 263, with Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955,
Vol. 1, Ch. 37, § 357, particularly as the same refers to First and Fourth Class cases.
. 32 The Municipal Court of Evanston has two elected judges who handle a volume
of approximately 16,000 cases a year. The single judge of the Municipal Court
of Oak Park, which court was established in 1955, deals with about 10,000 cases a
year.
33 Ill. Const. 1870, Art. VI, § 26, provided that a petty criminal sessions in
Chicago known as the Recorder's Court should be continued with its name changed
to the Criminal Court of Cook County and its jurisdiction enlarged to comprehend
"all cases of criminal and quasi criminal nature" arising in the county. To avoid
a conflict with the constitutional power vested in circuit judges generally by Ill.
Const. 1870, Art. VI, § 12, the enlarged court was not provided with a staff of
separate judges but it draws from the bench of the Circuit and Superior Courts of
Cook County, the judges of which courts are declared to be exx off-cio judges of the
Criminal Court of Cook County.
34 State concern with dependent, neglected or delinquent children was manifested
by the passage of Laws 1899, p. 31, which statute, as amended, appears in Ill. Rev.
Stat. 1955, Vol. 1. Ch. 23. § 190 et seq. Jurisdiction over proceedings under this
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Even more remarkable was the action by which a city court then
operating in Chicago became the Superior Court of Cook County35
The latter is not particularly superior in any degree but is a direct
rival, with equivalent jurisdiction, of the circuit court existing in
that county. 6 The existence of this court furnishes an example
of the ultimate in governmental folly, that of providing a complete
duplication of an already existing and sufficient facility at taxpayer expense.
The practice of fragmentation so noted was not restricted to
courts at the trial level but was carried over in relation to the
matter of providing review on appeal. Recognizing, in 1877, that
the work load of the state Supreme Court was pressing beyond
the limit of human endurance, the legislature provided for the
creation of four comparable but independent Appellate Courts,3 7
one to serve in each of the four districts into which the state
was divided for this purpose.38 No one could express any justifistatute is vested in the circuit courts and the county courts throughout the state
except that, In Cook County, a special courtroom was set aside for the hearing
of cases of this nature. This courtroom, now located In a separate building distant
from the principal courthouse, was for a time described as the Juvenile Court but,
in 1955, its name was changed to Family Court: Laws 1955, p. 2093: Ill. Rev. Stat.
1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 23, § 192a. The court should be distinguished from a division of the
Municipal Court of Chicago which handles support cases, which division, as is
true In many other instances concerning the divisions of that court, has acquired a
popular name. Again, to avoid constitutional conflict, no special judge was authorized for the Family Court so it is served by one of the judges of the Circuit
Court of Cook County assigned for the purpose.
35 Ill. Const. 1870, Art. VI, § 23.
36 Judges of the Superior Court of Cook County are said, by Ill. Const. 1870,
Axt. VI, § 24, to have "all the powers of a circuit judge." From the legal standpoint, therefore, It would generally be a matter of indifference whether a litigant,
about to file a proceeding in a major trial court in Cook County, should turn to
the left or to the right as he stepped from an elevator and approached the offices
of the clerks of the two tribunals which offices, by design or otherwise, are located
on the same floor of the court building. Practical considerations, not always limited
to the matter of the degree of congestion of the docket, might enter into the
choice.
The
37 Laws 1877, p. 69; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 37, § 25 et seq.
judges serving in the several Appellate Courts are not elected to that office but
are designated by the Supreme Court from among the circuit and superior court
benches: ibid., Ch. 37, § 29.
38 The Appellate Court for the First District exercises its limited appellate
jurisdiction solely over the courts in Cook County. Those for the Second, Third
and Fourth Districts at one time served in areas corresponding to the northern,
central and southern grand divisions of the Illinois Supreme Court, referred to in
note 22, ante. Realignment of these three districts was made in 1951, so the
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able criticism over the basic legislative purpose in relieving the
Supreme Court of the pressure of work which had besieged it,
but the precise realignment of the reviewing function was not
worked out on any realistic basis.3 1 In certain instances, appeals
and the like still proceed directly from the trial court to the state
Supreme Court ;40 in others, the appeal has to be carried to the
appropriate Appellate Court from whence, after review before
that tribunal, the matter might still proceed to the highest court
42
in the state4 for its further consideration.
With this increase in the number of courts has come a parallel
increase in the number of judges. An estimate made in 1956 indicates that the people of the state have over 3800 judges, at
various levels, currently empowered to hear and determine cases. 43
present boundaries of these districts are those disclosed in Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955,
Vol. 1, Ch. 37, § 25. The three last-mentioned courts, however, still sit at Ottawa.
Springfield and Mount Vernon, respectively, and review, to the extent noted, the
determinations of the trial courts located within their areas: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955,
Vol. 1, Ch. 37, § 40.
39 The several Appellate Courts exercise no more than a reviewing function,
being completely without original or trial jurisdiction: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1,
Ch. 37, § 32. They do, in general, pass on all appeals and the like except in those
cases which, by ibid., Ch. 38, § 780' and Ch. 110, § 75(1), are designated as matters which should proceed directly to the Illinois Supreme Court. Under the
present scheme, review might be obtained directly before the Supreme Court in a
case involving a small vacant lot of land worth a few hundred dollars, because a
freehold might be involved, but the appeal in a case involving a contract between
two large corporations, where millions of dollars might be at stake along with highly
Important matters of commercial concern, would have to go at least In the first
Instance, to one of the appellate courts and might never reach the Supreme
Court.
40 See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 780',
as to writs of error in criminal
cases above the grade of misdemeanor, and Ibid., Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 75(1), for
some seven instances of civil proceedings wherein direct appeal would be proper.
41 Cases may reach the state Supreme Court after determination of the appeal
by one of the four Appellate Courts but such further consideration is not insured
as a matter of right. The possibility of further review is restricted by the necessity that the aggrieved party either secure a certificate of importance signed by a
majority of the appellate judges concerned or be able to induce the Supreme Court
to grant leave to appeal to It, in which last instance the case, if one for money
damages, must Involve $1,500 or more: Ill, Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 75.
42 The circumstances and process by which a case may come before the United
States Supreme Court after full consideration before state trial and reviewing
courts goes beyond the scope of this article and is not discussed.
43 A chart of the Illinois judicial system, compiled by Citizens of Greater Chicago, would Indicate that in 1956, the total judicial personnel Included 7 Supreme
Court Judges; 18 Appellate Court judges; 92 circuit and superior court judges,
exclusive of the 18 assigned to sit in the Appellate Courts; 102 county court judges;
14 probate court judges; 29 city court judges; 40 municipal court judges: approximately 2900 justices of the peace; and some 590 police magistrates.
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It can be anticipated that, by the end of the current session of
the General Assembly, the size of the bench will be still larger
for a number of measures have been introduced, some have even
been passed, calling for the subdivision of certain of the judicial
circuits and for the creation of additional judgeships. The total
of the personnel serving in the judicial department of the state
would run into many hundreds more for no count has been attempted of such supernumaries as the masters in chancery 44 and
47
4
the referees, 45 not to mention the clerks, " deputy clerks, sheriffs,
deputy sheriffs, bailiffs 48 and the rest who participate, to some
degree, in the exercise of the judicial power. No taxpayer should
be unconscious of the fact that, except where the litigant is obliged
44 As each circuit and superior court may, at some time or another, have occasion
to hear one or more equity matters, it has been considered appropriate for there to
be at least one master in chancery in each county and as many masters in Cook
County as there are judges in the two courts located there: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955,
Vol. 2, Ch. 90, § 1. These functionaries perform the customary duties of that office,
which may be described as serving as assistants to the chancellors, i.e., the judges
assigned to hear equity matters.

45 See, in general, IlII. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 117, § 1 et seq. A referee
is an official assigned to serve in a law court in a manner comparable to the master
in chancery of the equity court. The services of referees are utilized extensively
in the Municipal Court of Chicago, both in connection with traffic violations and
in citation proceedings to discover assets of judgment debtors. See, in that connection, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955. Vol. 1, Ch. 37, § 363.
46 Each court will need the services of a clerk to keep its records, which official
would also then perform certain minor judicial functions, such as administering
oaths, authenticating court papers and the like. The general powers of these
clerks, most of whom are elected officials, are described in Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol.
1, Ch. 25, § 1 et seq. See also, ibid., Ch. 37, §§ 27, 310, 339, 369 and 453.

47 Ill. Const. 1870, Art. X, § 8, provides for the election of a sheriff in each
county of the state who shall serve for a term of four years. While the sheriff
performs certain police functions, in connection with which he may invoke the aid
of a posse comitatus, he also serves the several state courts by carrying out the
command of all judicial writs, by being in attendance at all court sessions, and by
exercising custody over the court house and the jail: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2,
Ch. 125, particularly §§ 14, 15 and 19. The Illinois Supreme Court is served by a
comparable official designated as the marshall: ibid., Vol. 1, Ch. 37, §16.
48 The municipal courts are served by bailiffs who, within the court area, perform services analogous to those performed by the several sheriffs: Ill. Rev. Stat.
1955, Vol. 1. Ch. 37, §§ 371 and 456. The justice of the peace has the benefit of
the services of one or more constables: ibid., Vol. 1, Ch. 79, § 1.
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to bear the cost,49 the expense of operating a judicial department
of this magnitude is paid out of tax funds.50

III.

DEFECTS IN PRESENT SYSTEM.

The foregoing brief summary of the present structure of the
judicial system in Illinois should prove to be helpful in pointing
up the fact that, in this welter of courts, there is room for the
existence of not one but a number of evils. In the first place, it
should be obvious that the state is plagued with an unnecessary
duplication of expensive, and frequently equivalent, facilities.
One simple illustration should suffice. An unpaid employee, living
in Cook County, asserting a claim for unpaid wages in an amount
not exceeding $500.00, might choose to enforce his remand before
any one of approximately 125 justices of the peace or he might
turn for help to any of the 90-odd police magistrates.5 1 He might,
for that matter, provided jurisdictional and venue requirements
were observed, use either of the three city courts ;52 select from
among the three municipal courts, one of them staffed with 37
judges ;13 place his claim before the county court;" or call upon
either the Circuit Court or the Superior Court of Cook County5 5
49 In addition to the payment of standard filing fees and the like, charged to
all litigants except those who can demonstrate indigence, a party who has recourse
to the services of a master in chancery may have to pay such master for the
rendition of his peculiar services: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 90, § 9. The
details of the "compensation" there referred to may be ascertained by reference
to ibid., Vol. 1, Ch. 53, § 38. In a complicated case, these costs may run into
a sizable figure. In periods of depression when equity business relating to foreclosure of real estate mortgages is apt to be of substantial volume, the annual
earnings of a busy master may outrank the salary paid to the judge whom he
assists. Except for the justice of the peace, the master in chancery is the sole
remaining "fee" officer of the state judicial department. that is one not serving
on a fixed salary.
50 Certain of the courts are either self-supporting from the fees and costs charged
for their services or may even produce an annual surplus, which is paid to the
public treasury. This is understood to be the case with respect to the Probate
Court of Cook County and the Municipal Court of Chicago. Others may be in
the same class, but the cost of operating most of the courts exceeds the amount
derived from fees and costs.
51 See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 79, § 16, and Ch. 24. § 9-73.

52 Ibid., Vol. 1, Ch. 37, § 333.
53 Ibid., Vol. 1, Ch. 37, § 357 and § 444.
54 Ibid., Vol. 1, Ch. 37, § 177, when read in conjunction with ibid., Vol. 1, Ch. 79,
§ 16.
55 I1. Const. 1870, Art. VI, § 12 and § 24.
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for assistance. The existence of a degree of competition among
business enterprises and commercial establishments may be a good
thing. But one may well ask if the same thing is necessarily true
where government agencies are concerned.
Aside from the waste involved in the mere duplication of
available facilities, there is the further danger that, at the time
of making a selection of the tribunal to whom he will apply for
the purpose of securing justice, the litigant or his lawyer may
overlook or confuse one or more of the jurisdictional factors circumscribing the competence of the particular court to provide him
with relief. It should pass without comment that only a court
which has been authorized to hear and determine a particular kind
or type of case, whether by constitutional grant or by legislative
fiat, may consider such a matter, for otherwise judges would be
able to arrogate to themselves powers which the people might not
wish them to possess. The extent of a given court's jurisdictional
power, however, is not always an obvious fact and may not be
determinable until after protracted delays and the expenditure
of large sums of money. Again, one simple illustration should
be sufficient.
Some time ago, a railroad employee who had lost a leg while
working in a switch yard at Decatur in Mason County instituted
a suit to recover damages from his employer before the City Court
of Granite City, located in Madison County. His case was tried
and he secured a verdict in his favor. For reasons not here important, this verdict was set aside by the trial judge. Appeals from
that holding were considered successively by the Appellate Court
for the Fourth District 56 and by the state Supreme Court 7 with
the result the case was sent back to the trial court for further proceedings. After return and while his case was still pending, the
Illinois Supreme Court, in an entirely independent suit involving
other parties, announced it to be the rule that city courts were
without power to entertain cases involving transactions which occurred beyond city limits5 8 Upon learning of this fact, the injured
56 See Herb v. Pitcairn, 306 I1.

App. 583, 29 N. E. (2d)

543 (1940).

57 377 Ini. 405. 36 N. E. (2d) 555 (1941).
58 Werner v. Illinois Central R. R. Co., 379 Ill. 559..42 N. E.

(2d) 82 (1942).
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switchman asked the city court to transfer his case to the Circuit
Court of Madison County, a court which would clearly have power
to act. The case was transferred but the circuit court thereafter
dismissed the action on the theory that no valid suit had been
instituted until the moment when the transfer became complete
and, as this happened about six years after the date of the injury,
the claim was barred by limitation.
Again the injured switchman sought review and his case
appeared in the Illinois Supreme Court for the second time.'
This time the high court agreed with the trial judge and affirmed
the dismissal of the suit. The plaintiff, fortunately for him, was
able to interest the United States Supreme Court in his plight."
That court, on the initial hearing, expressed some uncertainty as
to the basis for the holding of the Illinois Supreme Court so it
The case was again predirected that clarification be secured.'
for
the third time and it
Court
Supreme
sented to the Illinois
2
The federal Supreme Court
provided the desired clarification.
that, for this purpose, the
concluded
and
returned to the problem
action was sufficiently "commenced" to prevent rise of the defense of bar by limitation at the time it had been originally instituted, even though begun before a court which was actually unable
to proceed to judgment,6 3 so the earlier decisions were ordered
reversed. Upon return of the record to the Illinois Supreme
Court for the fourth trip, it coincided with this determination and
ordered the Circuit Court of Madison County, after almost ten
years of delay involved in these many maneuvers, to retake the
case and grant a hearing. 64 The irony of it all lies in the fact
that, within four more years, the Illinois Supreme Court changed
its mind on the basic point and ag-reed that city courts were not
59IHerh v. Pitcairn, 384 Ill. 237. 51 N. E. (2d)

277

(1943).

60 Cert. granted: 321 U. S. 759, 64 S. Ct. 786, 88 L. Ed. 1058 (1944).
Justice Black wrote a
61324 U. S. 117, 65 S. Ct. 459, 89 L. Ed. 789 (1945).
dissenting opinion which was concurred in by Douglas and Murphy, JJ. Justice
Rutledge also wrote a dissenting opinion.
62392 111. 151, 64 N. E.

(2d)

318

(1945).

68 325 U. S. 77, 65 S. Ct. 954, 89 L. Ed. 1483 (1945).
64 392 IH. 138, 64 N. E.

(2d)

519 (1946).
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so confined and might, in appropriate instances, hear cases which
arose from events occurring outside of municipal limits."5
It is true the particular switchman referred to eventually suffered no irremediable harm from his choice of a tribunal yet he
would no doubt assert that the delay he experienced fell far short
of compliance with the command to grant prompt justice. For
that matter, he must also feel that he was being obliged to purchase justice at an excessive cost. This illustration, while bordering on the extreme, could be multiplied by a score or more of
other instances every year, both at the trial and at the appellate
level,66 for not even after a hundred and more years of experience
with a complicated judicial structure has it been possible to obviate all of the jurisdictional hurdles which stand between the litigant and the justice which he seeks.
Mention has been made of the financial waste present each
year in the operation of the many competing and duplicative
tribunals, each with its staff of paid public servants. It would be
impossible to indicate the overall cost for while some of these
employees are paid from state funds others draw their compensaNot
tion from county budgets6 7 or from municipal treasuries.6
65 See the holding in Turnbaugh v. Dunlop, 406 Ill. 573, 92 N. E. (2d) 438
(1950), for a determination with reference to a city court, and in United Biscuit
Co. of America v. Voss Truck Lines, Inc., 407 Ill. 488, 95 N. E. (2d) 439 (1950),
for a similar result with reference to the Municipal Court of Chicago.
66 In the period from 1953 to 1956 for example, as disclosed from a check made
of the eight most recent bound volumes of the reports of the Illinois Supreme
Court designated 1 Ill. (2d) to 8 Ill. (2d) inclusive, 17 appeals taken to the
Supreme Court were ordered transferred to the appropriate Appellate Court
because the jurisdiction of the highest state tribunal had been improperly invoked,
principally because of a misunderstanding as to whether or not a freehold In
land was involved In these cases. In 20 other instances in the same period, the
Supreme Court was obliged to spend time passing on jurisdictional objections even
though in 13 of these instances the objections ultimately proved to be groundless.
Of the remaining seven instances, 3 of the appeals were dismissed because the
issues had become moot; 1 was dismissed because in fact no constitutional issue
was involved; in 2 instances, the court found that it had improperly granted leave
to appeal so eventually dismissed the matters from further consideration; and in
the other case It concluded that the debatable point had been settled by recourse
to the principle of res judcata, hence Justified refusal of further consideration.
67 Judges of the Circuit and Superior Courts of Cook County, after being paid
a uniform salary equal to that paid the other circuit judges of the state out of
the state treasury, receive an additional allowance of compensation from county
funds: Ill. Const. 1870, Art. VI, § 25.
68 Judges of municipal courts are, by law, to be paid fixed salaries from city
treasuries: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 37, §§ 363 and 450. Police magistrates,
where not on a fee basis, are likewise paid from the municipal treasury: ibid.,
Vol. 1. Ch. 24, § 9--78.1.
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even the legislature knows the full financial burden placed on the
taxpayers of the state nor, for that matter, does it seem to care
whether the public receives full value for every dollar that is spent.
If a business operated on that basis it would soon become bankrupt, either because hidden leaks exhausted its funds or because,
the full cost being known, it would be pricing its product above
what the market would bear. The attainment of justice is not, of
course, a matter to be calculated solely in terms of dollars and
cents, but when the government deals with the taxpayer's money
no one seems to care until the breaking point has been reached.
Worst of all, each of the many courts which form the structure of the judicial department of the state is an empire unto
itself with the judge sitting in the position of a petty tyrant who
is accountable to no one, except as he may be accountable to an
uninformed electorate on election day, for the operation of his
tribunal. There is no periodic reporting to any central authority
for work done or left undone ;69 no punching of the time clock ;7
no obligation to demonstrate to a superior authority whether the
degree of service rendered justifies the continued existence of the
tribunal ;71 and no considered duty to help out other courts which
69 Court statistics are usually limited to such matters as (1) the number of cases
pending at the beginning of the period, (2) the number of new suits filed during
the period, and (3) the number of cases which remain pending at the close of
the period. The manner of disposition of those cases which are tabulated as
being terminated, whether the disposition came by way of settlement, trial, or
dismissal for want of prosecution, is not usually recorded.

70 Court rules usually prescribes the hour at which the sessions of the court are
scheduled to begin at the opening of the judicial day. The duration of the
sessions, the interval for luncheon, etc., is not usually fixed and is typically
announced from the bench. Trial sessions do not generally run beyond ordinary
business hours but may be, and have been, carried on into evening hours. Where
agreement cannot be reached to take a sealed verdict, a judge may be obliged
to remain on hand until late at night to receive the verdict and discharge the
jury. It is not advocated that a time clock should be installed in every court
house but, if a record was kept of the amount of time actually devoted to judicial
duties, the record might prove to be an astonishing one.
71 Except as to circuit judges who are required by the state constitution to
report periodically to the general assembly as to the number of days on which
they have held court in the several counties composing the circuit, the only
obligation on the part of the judges of courts of record is to report annually to
the Illinois Supreme Court "such defects and omissions in the laws as their experience may suggest," to the end that the Supreme Court may make a similar
report to the governor, together with appropriate forms of bills to cure such
defects and omissions: Ill. Const. 1870, Art. VI, § 31.
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may be overburdened and falling behind in their work. 72 It is
true that many judges serve faithfully, work longer hours than
the public might suspect, and strive earnestly to see to it that the
ideal of justice is served to the fullest measure, but what as to
the rest? Business enterprises come quickly to recognize the
presence of indifference or incompetence on the part of their employees and deal swiftly with these problems. Impeachment of
judges on the other hand is a laborious and a difficult, if not impossible, goal to attain."
The net result, then, is that in too many instances, the socially
desirable ideal that justice should be promptly attained is not
presently being observed. Where not actually a matter of some
doubt,74 justice is achieved too frequently only through inefficient
means, at excessive cost, and after such long delays as to make
it no justice at all.
These complaints are not local to Illinois but have been expressed elsewhere. A special committee of the Association of the
Bar of the City of New York, within the past few months, has
issued a report in which it has stressed the desirability of a longoverdue reform in and reorganization of the court system of
New York. This report points out, what has been said before in
72 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 37, § 72.29, indicates that the several circuit
judges "may interchange with each other" whenever they find it "necessary or
convenient."
Similar provision exists in Ch. 37, § 297, with respect to county
judges, and in Ch. 37 § 338, for judges of city courts, who may interchange not
only with one another but may also serve in other courts of the state. These
provisions are no more than permissive at best. Whether a trial judge will make
an interchange is left entirely to his discretion.
73 The process of impeachment, fixed by Ill. Const. 1870, Art. VI, § 30, requires
not only that cause for removal shall exist but that three-fourths of all the
members elected to each house of the general assembly shall concur in the
resolution.
74 Reference has been made on more than one occasion to the suggestion that
the letters J. P., the common abbreviation for justice of the peace, should be
reversed, so as to stand for "plaintiff's judge." The argument is that the official
in question, from expediency or otherwise, rarely decides adversely to the person
who brings the suit. It is true that if the plaintiff had not elected to proceed
before the particular justice of the peace, the latter would have lacked an opportunity to earn the fees fixed by law for his services, hence his office might have
proved to be an unprofitable one. A litigant with a large volume of business might
well expect to receive some form of preferential treatment, failing which he would
be inclined to take his business elsewhere. In the absence of statistics to conform
or refute the underlying assumption, the suggestion has become something of a
common jest.

JUDICIAL REFORM FOR ILLINOIS

this state,7 5 that there are three essential requirements for an
effective court system, to-wit: jurisdictional unity, administrative
unity, and fiscal unity. As to the first of these, the committee
states:
If a citizen has a legal case, he should be able to go to court
and get that case decided, quickly and completely. He should
not have to run the risk of discovering too late that he has
picked the wrong court, or that the court he has picked can
decide only part of his case, and that he must go to another
court to obtain the justice to which he is entitled. ....
Fragmentation of jurisdiction not only thwarts justice . . . it
makes necessary an army of part-time judges to man the
specialized courts. . . . Jurisdictional unity at one stroke
will eliminate this catalogue of defects in the present court
system.7 6
On the point of administrative unity and its significance in
a well-operated judicial system, the committee remarks that if the
average citizen
is only dimly aware of the way in which cases are decided in
the courts, he is probably far less aware of the way in which
the system of courts is administered. If a judge in one court
has little to do and another court is overloaded, can that
judge be assigned to the overloaded court? Under our present system, the answer is no. . . . Can cases be transferred
from one court to another, in order to even out the work
load? Again the answer is almost always no. . . . What
about the judge's supporting staff of legal assistants, court
clerks, probation officers, etc.? Are they paid throughout the
state at the same rate for the same type of job? Not under
the present system. It is demoralizing as well as inefficient
for a court official in a busy court in one area to be paid substantially less than what a colleague in a less active court is
paid for the same job ....
Some judges have no assistants;
'75 See

note 1, ante.
See a report by the Special Committee on the Administration of Justice of
the Association of the Bar of the City of New York entitled "Court Reform and
the Citizen-1957," pp. 3-5.
76

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

others have more than they can use. These are only samples
of the inefficiencies of our present non-integrated court system. . . . The problem of administrative unity is intimately
bound up with the problem of jurisdictional unity. As long
as there is chaos in the jurisdiction of the courts, unity and
77
efficiency of administration is very difficult to achieve.
Financial matters were not neglected by the New York Committee. After noting that the total expense of the court system
operated there ran in the neighborhood of $70,000,000 a year, it
appended the thought that, their being no overall budget, it was
imperative that there be one budget and one fiscal control for
the judicial system, covering all courts, judges and court personnel. The citizen as taxpayer is entitled to know the cost of
justice. The Legislature in voting appropriations should be
able to find out what the money is going for. An overall
budget for fiscal control goes hand in hand with administrative control.78
While the Committee offered no prediction as to the operating
cost of the reformed judicial system which it advocated for that
state, it could be inferred that the consolidation of the courts, the
elimination of duplicating facilities, the reduction in the number
of the required staff, and the abolition of part-time servants and
services would reduce the overall cost. No precise estimate has
been compiled for use in Illinois but the indication is that the
present staff of more than four thousand judicial officers, together
with the untold number of their clerical and other assistants,
could be reduced to as much as one-fifth of that number, 9 par77 Op. cit., pp. 5-6.

18 Op. cit., p. 6.
79 The proposed revision of the judicial article of the state constitution contemplates an overall bench consisting of 7 Supreme Court judges; 20 judges at the
intermediate appellate level; approximately 200 trial judges with full rank; and
possibly 400 associate judges to serve, in special types of proceedings, in the circuit
courts distributed throughout the state. The circuit courts will exercise unlimited
original jurisdiction in all justiciable matters. To avoid constitutional difficulties,
existing judges sitting in county, probate, city and municipal courts, together with
all justices of the peace and police magistrates, will be permitted to complete their
terms of office by being covered into the new judicial system at appropriate levels.
The offices of master in chancery and referee will be abolished. The quality of the
bench would, to some degree, be enhanced by a proposed requirement that all
judges be duly admitted lawyers. While most judges, at least in courts of record,
are such, the specific qualification of admission to law practice is imposed only in
rare instances.
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ticularly so if all served the needs of the state in a full-time capacity. The possibilities for a reduction in the cost of administering justice should alone command attention but the efficiency
of a reformed system would be worth it even if the cost was greater
than it is at present.
IV.

THE PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE.

It is hard to conceive that two of the greatest states in the
nation, among the many others similarly beset, should be so
plagued by the inefficiencies of an antiquated system in an era of
jet-type propulsion in most other respects. At a time when so
much energy is being directed toward the modernization of trade
and commerce and to the improvement of the products of business
enterprise, the judicial department of the government has been
standing relatively still. While the techniques of doctors and
surgeons have been refined, while the boundaries of scientific
knowledge have been pushed farther and farther outward, the
high political art of resolving the conflicts which develop among
men living in an organized society has generally been left to stagnate. If progressive measures are not soon adopted, that art will
perish, bringing ruin in its train.
Fortunately, that prospect should not serve to dismay for long.
Thinking men have answered to the challenge and have fabricated
plans for reform.80 Such plans have been shaped and tested not
only in the crucible of the human mind, after hours of earnest
discussion, but in the actual experience of other states, notably in
New Jersey"' and in Missouri.
These plans call for no extended
discussion at this late date and they now lie before the General
80 See, in general, Zacharias, "The Proposed Illinois Judicial Article," 30 CCICAGOKENT LAW RnvlEw 303-38 (1952), and Sears, "A New Judicial Article for Illinois,"
40 A. B. A. J. 755-8 and 804-7 (1954).
81 The adoption of Article VI In the New Jersey Constitution of 1947 has resulted in giving that state an integrated and simplified judicial structure which
has produced a high degree of efficiency. See Harrison, "New Jersey's New Court
System," 2 Rutgers U. L. Rev. 60 (1948), and Karcher, "New Jersey Streamlines
Her Courts," 40 A. B. A. J. 759-62 (1954).
82 The so-called "Missouri plan," by which a judge, after a period of judicial
service, runs for re-election against his own record rather than against a political
opponent, is, to some degree, incorporated in the Illinois proposal.
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Assembly of Illinois for the third time. 8 Given effective and
proper public support, they will yet be enacted into law.
ADDENDA.
Subsequent to the preparation of the foregoing material, the
70th General Assembly adopted 4 a substitute proposal for the
one aforementioned, officially designated by it as Senate Joint
Resolution 47. In essence, the substitute proposal follows fairly
closely along the lines of the original draft prepared by the Joint
Committee of the Illinois State and the Chicago Bar Associations"5 but with enough deviation to warrant the making of further
comment as it is not enough to say that the planned structure of
the judicial department will result in a much simpler form of
organization.
I.

THE PROPOSED SUPREME COURT.

There is to be, as would be expected, a single supreme court,
one composed of seven judges, three of whom are to be drawn from
Cook County, which will comprise the First Supreme Court District for this purpose, and two from each of two other districts
extending over the balance of the state.8 6 Five of these judges
83 On the first attempt, in 1953, the proposals passed the state Senate but failed
to secure the necessary two-thirds vote in the House. In 1955, the measure met
with rough treatment at the hands of the Executive Committee of the House and
failed in passage. The proposal was introduced, for the third time, in both branches
of the 70th General Assembly on February 27, 1957, and has been designated as
Senate Joint Resolution 17 and House Joint Resolution 17.
84 Senate action thereon occurred on June 20, 1957. The House concurred, with
amendments, on June 25th. A conference committee report, approved by both
houses on June 27, 1957, carried by more than the necessary two-thirds vote.
85 The text of the 1953 proposal is set forth in 30 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
303-13. It varied from SJR 17, referred to above at note 83, only slightly and then
only with respect to the manner of selecting judges. For all practical purposes,
therefore, the following comparisons are based on the contrast provided between
the text published earlier, hereinafter referred to as Original Draft, and the final
text of SJR 47.
86 SJR 47, § 4, provides for this division of the state "by law," subject to the
qualification that the districts shall be of "substantially equal population, each of
which shall be compact and composed of contiguous counties." Original Draft,
§ 4, specified the counties to be included in the districts by name. Neither proposal
made provision for any subsequent redistricting, so it is possible, once districting
has occurred, that the population aspect of the formula may, at some future time,
get out of balance.
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will be needed to constitute a quorum and the concurrence of four
will be needed for any decision. The chief justice is to be selected
by, and from among, the judges of the court, and is to serve in
that capacity for a term of three years or for the remainder of
his judicial term, whichever shall be the shorter. 7 One demonstrable and startling weakness, however, lies in the fact that judicial tenure, presently fixed at a term of nine years for supreme
court judges,"" is to be such, for all judicial officers, as may be
"provided for by law,'" thereby exposing the state to the possibility of subsequent legislative interference with the judicial arm
of the state unless an informed and alarmed electorate should rise
in protest over the threat.
The reconstituted supreme court is to be given general administrative authority over all courts, including the power to make a
temporary assignment of any judge to some other court, provided
the chief judge of the transferee court can be prevailed upon to
consent thereto, 0 and in the exercise of this administrative authority the court is empowered to appoint an administrative
director, with staff, to serve at its pleasure." It is to be the
repository of the rule-making power in matters concerning practice and procedure for all courts, 9 2 but again the legislature seems
to have yielded power grudgingly for the rule-making power is
declared to be "subject to law and laws hereafter enacted." ' 93 The
87 SJR 47, § 5. Original Draft, § 14, contemplated appointment of the chief justice
by the governor, for a term of six years, from a panel of two names submitted by a
judicial nominating commission.- The chief justice was there declared to be eligible
for re-appointment. While SJR 47 is silent, re-appointment should be a possibility
since there is no express prohibition against it.
88 11. Const. 1870, Art. VI, § 6. Under Original Draft, § 17, It was planned to
increase the term to twelve years.
89 SJR 47, § 11. By that section, the terms of all judicial officers will be at the
whim of the legislature, except that existing judges shall continue to hold office
until their terms expire and, until changed by law, the term for a supreme court
judge is to remain at nine years; SJR 47, Schedule, 4 and 4(g).
90 SJR 47, § 2. The administrative authority is to be exercised by the chief
justice in accordance with court rule.
91 Original Draft, § 2, placed the appointing power in the chief justice rather
than in the court as a whole.

92 Local rules for lesser tribunals are not prohibited provided they are not inconsistent with the general rules and any pertinent statutes.
93 S.JR 47, § 3.
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court is also made responsible for the holding of an annual judicial conference for the purpose of considering the business of the
several courts, suggesting improvements in the administration of
justice, and for the making of a report with respect thereto in
4
each legislative year.
Insofar as the judicial work of the supreme court is concerned,
it is to be authorized, but not required, to exercise the same limited
degree of original jurisdiction presently conferred on that court,
to which has been added the power to issue original writs of prohibition9 5 and to exercise so much other original jurisdiction as
may be needed for the complete determination of any cause on
review. As would be expected, the principal judicial function will
lie in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction. Direct appeal from
the circuit court as a matter of right has not been drastically revised9 6 except that two new heads have been added with respect
to cases involving "revenue," presumably the public revenue, and
over writs of habeas corpus, with power in the court, "subject to
law hereafter enacted," to provide by rule for direct appeal in
other cases. 7 Supervisory power over the determinations of the
several appellate courts as of right has been expanded to include
cases in which certification is made, by an unstated number of
judges of a division of such court, that the question is sufficiently
important to require supreme court consideration.
Further review in matters heard by the appellate court, presently given only
in case leave to appeal should be granted,9 9 has been left untouched
by anything in the proposed constitutional revision.
94 SJR 47, § 17. No provision for reporting was contained in Original Draft,
§ 22, inasmuch as Ill. Const. 1870, Art. VI, § 31, directs the Supreme Court to
report in writing to the Governor by January 1st in each year as to defects and
omissions in the law of the state.
95 SJR 47, § 6. For elaboration on this point, see 30 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEw
303, at p. 317, note 21.
96 SJR 47, § 6, second paragraph, still contains the provision for direct appeal
by a defendant from sentence in a capital case which was criticized in 30 CHICAGOKENT LAw RLIEw 303, at p. 317, note 23.
97 The possibility is visualized that the legislature, acting under the influence
of pressure groups, may expand upon the list.
98 SJR 47, § 6. Compare with Original Draft, § 6, paragraph three, and Schedule,
3, annexed thereto, set out in 30 CHICAGO-KENT LAw REVIEw 303, pp. 305 and 310,
respectively.
99 See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 75.
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REFORM FOR ILLINOIS

THE PROPOSED APPELLATE COURT.

Mention has been made of the fact that it was believed that
the state should be served by one intermediate reviewing tribunal,
to be organized in three convenient districts and with such number of internal divisions as might prove to be necessary, to be
staffed by fifteen judges, sitting in panels of three.' The legislature has seen fit to disagree with this proposal in certain respects for it insists upon a continuation of the present four-fold
division of the state for purpose of appellate court districts 2 and
has expressed the belief that the total bench should consist of 21
judges. Twelve of the judges are to serve in the First District,
with three others in each of the remaining three districts, but
authority has been given the supreme court to make re-assignment
provided a majority of the judges in any district consents thereto.
Considering the work load which will probably fall on the shoulders
of this court by reason of the imminent reduction in the appellate
jurisdiction of the supreme court,3 the proposed expansion would
seem to be a justified one.
The jurisdiction of the revised appellate court will be little
different from that originally contemplated since it is to extend,
as a matter of right, to all cases in which final judgments have
been reached by the several circuit courts, excluding those in
which direct appeal to the supreme court would be proper, and
may be made to extend, by supreme court rule, to non-final judgments and determinations. While expeditious and inexpensive
appeals are to be encouraged by some suitable supreme court rule,
the provision for "review by informal proceedings in designated
130 CHICAGO-KENT LAW RmEIEW 303, at p. 323. The planned tenure of these
appellate judges was set at twelve years by Original Draft, § 17, in lieu of the
six-year term presently applicable to them in their capacity as judges of the circuit
court. The legislature has, by SJR 47, Schedule, 4(g), agreed to a nine-year term
but it is subject to the reserved power to establish the tenure of all judges "by
law." See SJR 47, § 11.
2 Cook County is to constitute the First Appellate Court District, but the proposed
boundaries of the other three are to be fixed by law, under SJR 47, § 4, subject to
the proviso that, until so changed, the boundaries are those fixed in 3(a) of the
Schedule thereto.
8 See, in that connection, 30 CCICAGO-KENT LAw RLFTW 303, at p. 325, note 70.
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types of cases" has been deleted. 4 One limitation, seeming to
proceed from an excess of caution, has been added. It specifies
that "after a trial on the merits in a criminal case, no appeal shall
lie from a judgment of acquittal." Except for the possibility of
an increase in the case load by reason of the retention of the provision for "direct review of administrative action as may be
provided by law,' '5 the sections relating to the proposed appellate
court probably could pass without criticism.

III. THE

PROPOSED CIRCUIT COURT.

No better illustration of the art of political compromise could
be found than in the sections relating to the several circuit courts.
The outstanding concept for reform of the judicial structure rested
on the premise there should be one trial court possessed of unlimited original jurisdiction over all justiciable matters, with such
powers of review over administrative actions as may be provided
by law, in place of the present confused scheme of trial courts. The
legislature acquiesced therein6 so, with popular approval, the
aforementioned evils stemming from the present involved arrangement of competing, conflicting, and independent courts should
come to an end as these tribunals go out of existence. Abolition
of all fee officials serving on the staff of the judicial department
also seems about to be accomplished.' The number of the judicial
circuits, outside of Cook County which is to remain a judicial
district by itself, together with the size thereof and the essential
staff of each, is to remain, as it probably should because of the
possibility of change in local conditions, a matter for legislative
attention. Internal administrative control has, appropriately,
Compare SJR 47, § 8, with Original Draft, § 8.
5 This language appears In both Original Draft, § 8, and SJR 47, § 8.
6 SJR 47, § 10, is the same as Original Draft, § 10.
4

7 Both S3R 47, § 9, second paragraph, and Original Draft, § 9, declare: "There
shall be no masters in chancery or other fee officers In the judicial system." The
Schedule to Original Draft, 12, directed that existing masters in chancery and
the like should be continued "until the expiration of their terms." The Schedule to
SJR 47, 8, contains the same language but adds they may thereafter, "by order
of court, wherever justice requires, conclude matters in which testimony has been
received."
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been left to the chief judge of the circuit. But at about this point,
the views of the drafters of the original proposal and those serving in the 70th General Assembly seem to diverge.
The Joint Committee of the two bar associations had deemed
it to be appropriate that the trial bench of the state should be
made up of circuit and associate judges, at least one of each of the
latter in each county, to be selected for substantial terms, possessed of suitable qualifications, prohibited from engaging in
private law practice or other non-judicial work, paid a uniform
salary from the public treasury, plus necessary expenses when
serving beyond the county boundary, and protected against diminution in salary during their terms of office." They were to be assisted,
where the need arose, by such number of magistrates as might be
prescribed by the supreme court, which was to have power to
limit and define the matters to be assigned to them. These magistrates were expected to possess the same qualifications as needed
for judges and were also expected to be full-time judicial servants.
Existing judges whose terms had not expired were to be brought
into the reformed judicial structure at appropriate levels and
were to be given an opportunity to seek a renewal of those terms,
if deemed qualified, under a system which would have eliminated
many of the objectionable features to be found in a general election.
In place thereof, the legislature has offered the public a proposed system under which each of the trial courts will be staffed
by publicly elected judges and associate judges, who are to be
nominated by party convention or at a primary election held for
the purpose, whose terms of office will be subject to the pleasure
of the legislature, and who will be assisted by such number of
magistrates, appointed by the circuit judges, acting under whatever restrictions the legislature may see fit to impose.9 In Cook
County, at least twelve of the associate judges are to be drawn
from the county area outside of Chicago with at least thirty-six
8 See, In general, Original Draft, § § 9, 17-20.
9 SJR 47, § 11.
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of them originating inside of Chicago, 0 and the same proportion
is to be maintained with respect to the magistrates. While the
judges are to measure up to the aforementioned qualifications and
be full-time officials," the magistrates are not to be so subject,
hence a class of part-time and perhaps non-legally trained officials
will probably continue in the service of the judicial department,
exercising whatever jurisdiction the legislature may see fit to
specify. 2 About the only constitutional guarantees incorporated
in the proposal and designed to secure judicial independence would
appear to be (1) judicial salaries may not be diminished during
any term of office, 3 and (2) no change made in the area of a judicial district is to be permitted to affect the tenure of an incumbent judge."4 The specter of courts dominated by politics will,
therefore, remain to haunt the state.
Other miscellaneous provisions have met with a degree of
legislative approval. The plan to permit of a simpler system for
handling the matter of the retirement, suspension, and removal of
judges has been accepted subject to the proviso that the commission designated to pass on such matters is to be convened either
by order of the supreme court or "at the request of" the state
senate." Clerks of the several courts may, dependent on the
10 The twelve are designated to "run at large." until the system Is changed by
law. The proposal is silent as to the appropriate area of an election district for
the thirty-six, hence it could be possible, by law, to divide Chicago into as many
districts as there are associate judges to be elected and hold an election for a
single associate judge in each.
11 The legislature deleted, from SJR 47, § 14, all reference to the prohibition
against any judge or magistrate giving direct or indirect "financial contribution"
to any political party which had been contained in Original Draft, § 19.
12 SJR 47, § 9. Existing police magistrates and justices of the peace are, by SJR
47, Schedule, 4(e), to become the first magistrates of the revised trial courts; are
to be free to continue to perform their non-judicial functions; and, until change
occurs, will exercise a jurisdiction equivalent to that already possessed by them.
Original Draft, Schedule, 5, contemplated the integration into the new system
of only those judicial officers who had been "elected prior to the adoption" of the
Article and who were "in office on its effective date." SJR 47, Schedule, 5, by
contrast, makes it to be the sole condition that they be "in office" on the effective
date. Query: Is there room here for a sudden and last-minute expansion in the
staff of the judicial department after it has become known that the proposal is acceptable to the electorate?
'3 SJR 47, § 15. Original Draft, § 20, directed that salaries as to "each class of
judicial officer shall be uniform within each circuit," but this suggestion has been
disregarded. Provision has been made, however, for preserving a salary differential
in favor of judges in Cook County, with the additional compensation being drawn
from county funds.
14 SJR 47, § 13.
15 Compare SJR 47, § 16, with Original Draft, § 21.
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action of the legislature, be selected by the judges thereof or be
elected, l" but there will be no opportunity for any reduction in
the number of state's attorneys as one such official is to be elected
in each county 7 rather than one for each judicial district. 18 If
approved, the revised constitutional article is to become effective
on July 1, 1959, with all laws and court rules in effect on that
date being continued in operation, to the extent not inconsistent
with the changes thereby accomplished, until superseded in an
appropriate manner. 19
If any conclusion is to be drawn from the foregoing, it could
only be one to the effect that the state legislature, composed as
it is of elected officials, is not, nor could it be expected to be, willing to abrogate the Jacksonian principle which declares that, since
all public officials are public servants, they must, at periodic intervals, seek approbation from the electorate by standing for reelection. To expect that some future legislative body would muster the necessary two-thirds vote of each house to adopt some
other proposal calling for a different method to be used in selecting judges2" would strain credulity beyond limit. Nevertheless,
if perfection is not to be attained, there is enough good to be accomplished by the adoption of the proposed revision of the constitutional article that, when taken with the bad, it should receive
fair support. To deny that support would require one to dispute
with the common adage which affirms that half a loaf is better
than no bread at all. One could well wish the members of the
Illinois General Assembly were far better bakers than the halfloaf product they have turned out would indicate them to be.
16 SJR 47, § 18. With the legislative emphasis on the public election of judges,
it is unlikely that It will yield the appointing power in this instance to the courts.
17 SJR 47, § 19.
18 Original Draft. § 24, while providing for a continuation of the existing system
with respect to state's attorneys, did purport to authorize a change in the manner
of selecting, and a reduction in the number of, such officials, if the legislature
wished to exercise the privilege.
19 SJR 47, Schedule, 1 and 2.
20 SJR 47, § 11. While a vote of two-thirds of the members of each house is there
specified as a condition for the enactment of any law designed to change either
the method of selecting judges or their tenure in office, only a majority of those
voting upon the question when it is submitted to the electorate is considered
necessary to effectuate the change instead of the normal constitutional majority.
This departure from constitutional standards reflects an endeavor to prevent change
rather than to facilitate it, one based on an artful compromise worked out by
certain of the Cook County delegation to the General Assembly which, since redistricting, now dominates one of the houses.

